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Abstract
This study aimed to analyze policy effectiveness of loan for delaying timber harvesting for smallholder private forest 
business (Pinjaman Tunda Tebang Hutan Rakyat; hereinafter will be referred as PTT-HR). The analysis will be used 
to provide recommendations for improving PTT-HR scheme included scaling out and scaling up of the scheme for 
improving economic benefits and supporting smallholder private forest business as well as for strengthening 
farmer's welfare. Field survey was conducted in October–November 2013 in two districts in Central of Java, 
Indonesia namely Blora and Wonosobo District as recipient of PTT-HR from Public Service Agency for Forest 
Development Financing Center (BLU Center of P2H) Ministry of Forestry, Republic of Indonesia. The results 
showed that PTT-HR policy has implemented effectively based on evaluation parameter derived from the objectives 
of policy namely the age of the stands for loan collateral, the capabilities for improving farmer's welfare, utilization 
of loan, perception of the farmers regarding to the ease of the process and purpose of loan utilization, and the 
capability of loan repayment. However, this research has not been answered the aspect of PTT-HR policy 
implementation efficiency.  
Keywords:effectiveness, policy, loan for delaying timber harvesting, smallholder private forest, welfare
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Introduction
One of the problems faced by smallholder private forest 
(SPF) is their low financial capacities to fulfill their urgent 
needs of money in large amount such as children marriage 
ceremony expenses, health cares, children's school fees and 
house construction or renovation. In such situations farmers 
are forced to cut their immature trees.  The phenomenon is 
known as “harvesting for urgent needs (tebang butuh)” 
(Hardjanto 2001; Prihadi 2010; Nugroho & Tiryana 2013).  
In that condition bargaining position of farmers becomes 
weaker, so farmers will lose their opportunity to get optimum 
selling price. If any available micro credit institutions that 
can solve such urgent needs, farmer will have flexibilities for 
deciding the optimal age of trees will be harvested. Those 
flexibilities will increase economic benefits of the trees (Tee 
et al. 2010).
In 2012, Ministry of Forestry, Republic of Indonesia 
(MoF RI) through Public Service Agency for Forest 
Development Financing Center (BLU Center of P2H) has 
already launched a program called Revolving Fund 
Facilitation (RFF) for supporting forest and land 
rehabilitations (FLR) that regulated in MoF RI ecree D
N  P.36/2012 about loan distribution and repayment umber
mechanisms of RFF for FLR activities. To operate that 
regulation, Head of Center P2H issued  ecree No. A D
01/2012 about loan application guideline for SPF 
development without intermediary institution. Based on that 
decree one of the loan schemes available is loan for delaying 
timber harvesting for smallholder private forest business 
(  Pinjaman Tunda Tebang Hutan Rakyat; here in will be 
referred as PTT-HR).
Based on MoF RI Decree No 36/2012 there are some 
principles in RFF granting namely for empowering of people 
economies, poverty alleviations, expansion of employment 
opportunities, increasing forest productivities and 
environmental quality improvements regarding to FLR, with 
affordable terms and prudential principles. This matter is 
intended to strengthen business capital (investment) for FLR 
activities. Considering those principles and intentions, it 
seems that PTT-HR as one variant scheme of RFF can be 
categorized as micro and small credit (MSC). Basically the 
presence of MSC is mainly aimed to alleviate poverty with 
intension to provide farmer an opportunity for developing 
their livelihoods by them self to improve their income (Rauf 
& Mahmood 2009; Ondoro & Omena 2012; Qureshi  et al.
2012). MSC facilitation characteristics are targeted to poor 
people, farmers and micro-small businessmen, the targets 
have not bankable assets and subsidized interest rate (Ejigu 
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2009; Singh 2012; Bichanga & Aseyo 2013). Access  
availability of MSC institutions is indeed highly required by 
poor farmers in the rural (Yunus 1981; Khandker  1995), et al.
because formal bank institution is difficult to lend their 
money to farmers who havenot bankable assets and to small 
agricultural based businesses (Usman  2004; Wijono et al.
2005; Onoja & Agumagu 2009).
Not all of MSC programs are successful. Rauf & 
Mahmood (2009) reported that although in general the MSC 
programs in Pakistan show growth and significant progress 
but require a high management cost of MSC. Research 
results of Bichanga & Aseyo (2013) shows that most of the 
MSC recipients in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya failed to repay 
their loan caused by weak of supervision, lack of training 
program for management and utilization of loan, loan 
utilization didn t match with the goal of lending, borrowers o
didn t have enough assets for repaying the loan as well as o
household income has been drained to finance daily living. A 
similar failure occurred in Indonesia on granting business 
credit program for smallholder private forest (KUHR) and 
small business credit for watersheds (KUK-DAS) (Nugroho 
2011).  1997−2000 KUHR funds distributed for During
amount of IDR107.58 billion, but until May 2010 there are 
arrears of principal loan amounting to IDR105.82 billion and 
interest amounting to IDR65.15 billion. While the 
distribution of KUK-DAS amounting to IDR41.91 billion 
can only repaid amounting to IDR21.78 billion (52% from 
the loan) or resulted bad debts amounting to IDR20.12 billion 
(48% from the loan).
However, research of MSC program in Andra Pradesh, 
India concluded that although MSC couldnot resulting 
substantial net economic incomes for the farmers, but the 
program succeed to improve social capital, empower and 
engage women, create social safety net  and improve the ,
collective actions for fighting loan-shark (Ajit & Rajeev 
2012). According to Yunus (2007) empowerment and 
involvement of women in the management of MSC will 
increase the level of certainty in loan repayment, because 
generally women are more discipline in their use of the loan.
Normatively PTT-HR can be hoped to increase SPF 
surplus. Without support from PTT-HR, the farmers are 
forced to sell their trees under the optimum harvesting cycle, 
when they have urgent needs. PTT-HR has a role to avoid 
those compulsions, so SPF able to choose optimum 
harvesting time that gives more benefits. In the delaying time 
of harvesting the stands (trees) have opportunity to grow 
significantly and log prices will raise better.
Considering the research results of MSC program 
implementation from several countries explained above, the 
question in this research is t is true that PTT-HR can “I
increase SPF financial benefit, improve farmer's welfare and 
support SPF business  For that reasons, this study will ”?
focuses on effectiveness of PTT-HR by taking sample cases 
in Wonosobo and Blora (Province of Central Java, Indonesia) 
with the aim to draw up a recommendation for improving and 
find out the methods for scaling out and scaling up of PTT-
HR scheme to enhance economic benefits of SPF business, 
improve the welfare of farmers  and support SPF business, .
Methods
This study uses a descriptive-evaluative research approach 
that  is a study intended to explain in depth the result of 
policy evaluation (Elliot 2005; Irawan 2007). Policy 
evaluation is conducted to determine whether the 
implementation of such a policy was in accordance with the 
objective (refer to effectiveness) and is there guarantee that 
the funds for the implementation is not wasted (refer to 
efficiency) (Dye 2002; Dunn 2003; Tron 2009). In this study 
the focus of policy evaluation is limited to know 
effectiveness.
 The main problem in granting loans is the existence of 
asymmetric information between the lender and the 
borrower (Nugroho 2010). Theoretically, asymmetric 
information between parties can potentially induce moral 
hazard in ex post situation.  The form of moral hazard for the 
lender can be mismatch between the money mentioned in the 
credit agreement and the money received by borrowers, 
while from the borrower's side may be a non-conformity of 
loan repayment either about the amount and time of 
repayment of the loan.
 Policy that evaluated is direct incentives policy for 
providing access to farmer of SPF that was initiated by MoF 
RI (MoF RI Decree Number 36/2012 and Head of Center of 
P2H Decree Number 01/2012) with the aim to improve the 
welfare of farmers and to support business of SPFs. The 
method used is quantitative approach using structured 
questioner. The questionaire is developed to get information 
about (a) design of policies and implementation of PTT-HR 
loans, (b) the participation of community, (c) system to 
anticipate failure of repayment, (d) performance of PTT-HR 
(access, loan repayment prospect, and appropriateness to 
resolve harvesting for urgent needs), and (e) impact of PTT-
HR on farmers welfare. All information will be used to 
improve PTT-HR schemes regarding to the replication in 
other places (scale out) and the enhancement of the scale 
(scaled up) of PTT-HR.
 There is several information are needed for assessing the 
impact of PTT-HR that gives benefit for the farmers. Firstly, a 
pattern of tree growth (V(t)) i.e. relation between tree age and 
its volume. This information is needed to estimate 
incremental volume of the trees during delaying time of 
timber harvesting. Secondly, information about trends of 
wood price per unit volume p(t). Thirdly, information about 
interest rate of PTT-HR.
 In accordance with the provisions of central P2H the 
amount of the loan is given based on the number of collateral 
trees. In this study, the calculation of additional benefits 
from PTT-HR will be based on per collateral tree. At time (t0) 
it assumed that farmers sell the tree at price p(t0) per tree. 
Revenue gained by the farmers for selling one tree at time 
t0 is Rs(t0) = p(t0) . When the farmer's needs can be covered 
by PTT-HR the revenue of farmer at (t0) was equal to the 
credit acquired that is 80% of selling price, say Rk(t0) per 
tree. Say that harvesting and selling of one tree will be at time 
tn (>t0) and farmers will earn a revenue of Rs(tn) = p(tn) per 
tree. But, the farmers must repay the principal Rk(t0) plus 
interest (that calculated using simple interest method) as 
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much as Rk (t0)(tn − t0)(δ), so the net revenue received by 
farmers on (tn) is Rn(tn) = Rs(t0) − Rk(t0) − Rk(t0)(tn − 
t0)(δ).  The farmer have also to pay annual maintenance cost 
of the tree, say c(m) per tree, so total maintenance 
costs during lending period is     .                     Therefore, the 
present value of surpluses gained by the farmers from PTT-
HR program that assessed on ( 0) is as shown in Equation [1]:t
In which  is discount rate (%).d
 Farmers will decide to join PTT-HR program to delay 
harvesting if S > 0 and instead not to follow PTT-HR program 
if S < 0. The fact that there are farmers willing to join PTT-HR 
program, then for a while it is assumed that farmers get 
surplus from the PTT-HR.
 This esearch was conducted on two sites which ha  r  ve
PTT-HR program from Center of P2H. The first site was 
located in Wonosobo (Central Java, Indonesia) which 
represents a region with plant composition having a cutting 
cycle of less than eight years and a second site located in 
Blora (Central Java, Indonesia) representing a region with 
plant composition having a cutting cycle of more than eight 
years. Field research conducted  October− between
November 2013.
 The surveyed population is a farmer groups in Wonosobo 
and Blora that received PTT-HR from Center of P2H. In 
Wonosobo there is one group of farmer with total of 37 
members who become borrower of PTT-HR program. While 
in Blora there are eight groups of farmer with a total of 137 
borrowers. The sample size will be calculated by Slovin's 
formula as follow (Ridwan 2009):
           [2]
Note  ,  , : N = total of population n = sample size d = sampling 
error (in this research  10%)is
 
 Based on the Slovin's formula the sample size in 
Wonosobo consist of 27 borrowers (from 37 borrowers) and 
Blora was 58 borrowers (from 137 borrowers). So the total 
samples in the two studied districts are 85 respondents. 
Results and Discussion
Policy design of PTT-HR and the implementation P T T -
HR is a type of loan services provided by Center of P2H to 
prevent the trees from being felled before reaching the 
optimal age or diameter. The borrower is obliged to return the 
principal and its interest after a certain period of time 
(lending period). PTT-HR is one of four loan schemes 
provided by Center of P2H to support SPF management in 
Indonesia namely loans for (1) SPF development and/or 
enrichment, (2) SPF maintenance, (3) agroforestry 
development, and (4) delaying timber harvesting (PTT-HR) 
itself.
 The term of conditions for the PTT-HR include (Perkapus 
P2H No. 01/2012): (1) trees that can be used as collateral are 
the ones that have market value but still too young to be cut, 
(2) loan is given to the owner of the SPF who need a quick 
cash money while the trees is too young to be cut, (3) lending 
period is 5 years for long rotation species that needs more 
than 8 years to harvest and 3 years for short rotation species 
that needs less than 8 years to harvest, (4) loan delivery plan 
that is proposed in loan application for each parcel of land is 
made gradually according to diameter class or percentage of 
tree used as collateral, (5) the maximum limit of PTT-HR for 
each farmer group/cooperative is equivalent to 80.000 trees 
multiplied by standard cost of a tree, which is IDR20,000 per 
tree (Decree of the Head of Center of P2H N  umber
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c(t ) S
(tn – 1)
=
(t0 – 1)
c(m )
S =  Rn (tn) ( 1 +   )
– (tn – t0) – c(t) – Rs(t0)d
n
N
2(N.d  +1)
=
Figure 1 The application mechanism of PTT-HR.
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SK.16/P2H-1/2012), and (6) PTT-HR given is at most 80% of 
local market price. The application mechanism of PTT-HR 
program presented in Figure 1.
 Based on the regulation basically the PTT-HR scheme is 
really about providing farmers with credit and use trees as a 
collateral for certain period. After lending period is exceeded 
and the loan is repaid, the rights to the tree are fully returned 
to the borrower. This indicates that only the farmers who have 
tree will eligible to obtain the loans. This is understandable  
because the purpose of PPT-HR is to prevent tree owners 
from selling their immature trees.
 As of September 2013 the amount of loans that have been 
disbursed for  schemes of RFF was IDR24.73 billion for four
the 1,455 borrowers who joined in the 64 farmer groups. 
While loans disbursed to the PTT-HR scheme in the study 
area were IDR3,332,288,000 in which IDR201,312,000 to 
Wonosobo District and IDR3,130,876,000 to Blora District.
 The information about PTT-HR program is given by 
Center of P2H in conjunction with local government Forestry 
Office to leader of farmer group. Then the information is 
announced to the members of the group by leader of farmer 
group. The application of PTT-HR is submitted by the 
farmers group to Center of P2H office. Farmers who are 
interested in this program has to prepare some requirements 
like ID card, tally sheet of farmer's tree and letter of land 
ownership. Those all process is carried out by farmer group 
administrators without any supporting funds from Center of 
P2H.
 After all requirements has been collected then the farmers 
group prepare proposal. It was sent directly to Center of P2H. 
It took about 3−6 month waiting time for receive reply from 
Center of P2H, because of many incoming proposals to 
Center of P2H and limited of human resources of Center 
P2H. The Center of P2H evaluated all of documents from 
each individual farmer to decide potential borrowers (desk 
evaluation). The farmers who are considered to be potential 
borrowers will be verified in their origin area for field 
checking of the loan proposal and the conformity between 
registered tree in the tally sheet and its reality in the field 
randomly (field evaluation).
 The next step after field checking is signing the credit 
agreement with notarial witness. This process took about 1−2 
weeks. Credit agreement is signed under notarial witness and 
should be attended by married couple (if candidate has 
married) and ensured that whether the individual actually 
wants to get PTT-HR and did not under pressure by other 
parties. The loan is disbursed directly from the Center of P2H 
to each farmer who got loans with the assistance of BRI Bank 
to transfer of its funds.
The community participation  The farmer roles in PTT-HR 
application is mainly in preparing personal requirements 
such as ID card and letter of land ownerships. The 
community's response to this program is very positive, 
because: (1) the community feels that this program can 
potentially increasing the household income; (2) this 
program is seen as one source of capital to develop other 
businesses and (3) PTT-HR require small interest rates than 
other lending institutions (banks or credit unions). In the 
study locations, the bank required 15%−20% per annum 
interest rate, credit union applied 1.5% per month (or 18% 
per annum), but PTT-HR required only 5.75% per annum as 
much as Bank of Indonesia rate (BI rate).
 Standing stock (trees) as collateral is seen as a new 
breakthrough and fits perfectly with the character of the 
community in Wonosobo and Blora  Those relevancies .
and appropriateness become important factors in supporting 
effectiveness of the policies (Varone . 2006). For the et al
community, tree is an asset that has been used as a 
savings account in which can be used to fulfill urgent 
needs with a large amount of money. People realize that 
older tree have higher price, but sometimes they are 
forced to harvest the trees prematurely due to urgent 
circumstances. With the PTT-HR program, farmers are 
possible to maintain the trees until reaching the optimal 
economic value, beside get additional benefits from delaying 
timber harvesting.
Anticipating the delay and/or failure of repayment The 
survey result on Table 1 shows the mechanism to anticipate 
repayment failure, the efforts to make loan repayment on 
time, and possible forms of plant failure at the study site.
 Selling the livestock and agriculture products is the main 
option for many borrowers at Wonosobo and Blora to 
overcome repayment failure. This option was chosen by 26 
respondents (96%) at Wonosobo. They have confidence that 
selling the livestock and agriculture products would be 
enough to fulfill their loan repayment. While in Blora shows 
the different ways, in which only 44.8% of respondents who 
choose to repay the loan from livestock and agriculture 
products, and 46.6% respondents chose to reschedule the 
repayment.
 Most of Wonosobo peoples had the confidence to fulfill 
the loan repayment from the livestock and agriculture 
products instead of selling the collateral trees. Collateral 
trees in Wonosobo are sengon ( ) Paraserianthes falcataria
that had only less than eight years harvesting cycle and 
had lower economic value than teak ( ) Tectona grandis
that generally are used as collateral by farmers in Blora  .
It is imply to the amount of loan that received by farmers 
in Wonosobo who got loan less than IDR20 million lower 
than those in Blora that mostly received more than IDR20 
million.
 Most of borrowers in Blora are more prefer to extend the 
repayment time in order to get higher economic value from 
the collateral trees. Besides the business funded by PTT-HR 
also become more established. However, most borrowers in 
Blora also have confident that they could repay the loan from 
selling their livestock and/or agricultural products.
 The potential failure that might occur in Wonosobo is tree 
pests and diseases. Most of borrowers have the obstacles 
related to “ ” and worm that attack their trees. From karat furu
the interviews, 27 respondents (100%) in Wonosobo stated 
that pests and diseases are the main problem faced by farmer 
in maintaining collateral trees. Even currently there are 
collateral trees that have been felled because affected by 
pests and diseases, they had the fear that the trees would be 
dead and could not be sold. Whereas in Blora, 32 respondents  
(55.2%) stated that the potential failures that may occur in 
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maintaining collateral trees is natural disasters such as winds 
that can break the tree trunks. The other factors are pests and 
diseases that stated by 12 respondents (20.7%), thievery 
(12.7%)  and forest fires (12.7%).,
Performance of loan for delaying timber harvesting 
(PTT-HR) Performance of PTT-HR is assessed based on the 
ease of the loan acquiring process, required time from the 
loan application step up to the loan disbursement, utilization 
of the funds by the borrower, and funds disbursement phases 
to borrowers. Table 2 shows the result of interviews related to 
the PTT-HR performance from 27 respondents in Wonosobo 
and 58 respondents in Blora.
 PTT-HR application process perceived easily by the 
majority of borrowers (76.5%), mainly due to the ease of loan 
requirements such as ID card and letter of land ownerships 
which is later on to be processed by the farmers group 
administrators. Farmers in Wonosobo have more advantage 
in this process because their land already certificated, 
whereas in Blora the farmers initially had an obstacle in the 
land ownership document.
 On the contrary, for the management of farmer groups 
who take care of all member administrations up to the 
proposal-making stage, the PTT-HR lending process is 
difficult. Respondents who stated difficult (17.25%) and very 
difficult (6.9%) in Blora are mainly farmer group 
administrators. It is caused by the farmer group 
administrators has to compile all of personal requirements 
from the members, prepare proposal of the loan and submit 
the proposal to Center of P2H without any support of money 
from whoever. They also encountered problem regarding to 
the additional requirements from Center of P2H during the 
proposal making step, such as letter of land ownership that 
previously allow only using land tax notification letter 
(SPPT), but then there was a change to include letter of 
heritance of the land or grant letters if trees growing in a land  
that is not in the name of the borrower. The administrators of 
the farmer group felt that the system is burdensome because 
of the lack of operational costs, more over they also have to 
submit the proposal to Center of P2H office in Jakarta using 
money from the organization.
 Time required from the submission process until signing 
the loan agreement complained also by most all of borrowers. 
It takes up to 4 months in Wonosobo. Meanwhile in Blora 
takes more than 5 months caused by Mustika Jati Farmer 
Group Association which is consists of 8 farmer groups who 
spread across 8 villages want to submit the loan proposal 
collectively, so that the farmers groups who already 
completed all the document requirements have to wait the 
other farmer groups who have not been completed it.
 Most of the borrowers (96.5%) said that the money they 
have received is already matched with the proposal. But, 
there were complaints that the price of collateral tree 
estimated by Center of P2H  were lower than those estimated 
by borrowers (expressed by 98.8% of respondents). Probably 
the low estimation of price caused by prudential principles 
that applied by Center of P2H.
 Most respondents in Wonosobo (63.0%) and Blora 
(84.5%) used PTT-HR funds for business capital such as 
livestock business, farming, buying truck, trading, and 
agroforest cultivating. Other small parts (22.4%) use it to buy 
motorcycle, purchase land, renovate houses, children's 
school fees, and even for political needs namely village head 
election campaign. In the long term the use of PTT-HR funds 
for business capital is expected to alleviate poverty, develop 
self-employed farmers' businesses that can generate 
revenues, empower the people's economy, expand 
employment opportunities  and become a source of income ,
for the strengthening of loan repayments.
 Principally lending period that specified by P2H Center 
both in Wonosobo and Blora had been appropriate i.e  three
years for sengon and  years for teak. But there are other five
Table 1 Questionnaire result related to the loan payment and the possible failure form
Aspect
 Wonosobo
 
Blora
 
Total  
n  %  n  %  n  %
 
Anticipation for repayment failure:          
  
Selling livestock and agriculture products
 
26
 
96.3 %
 
26
 
44.8%
 
52
 
61.2%
 Rescheduling repayment
 
1
 
3.7 %
 
27
 
46.6%
 
28
 
32.9%
 Borrowing money from other institutions 
  
-
 
-
 
2
 
3.4%
 
2
 
2.4%
 
Sell the family assets
  
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.7%
 
1
 
1.2%
 
Selling assets and rescheduling repayment
  
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.7%
 
1
 
1.2%
 
Borrowing money from other institutions and rescheduling 
repayment
  
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.7%
 
1
 
1.2%
 
Efforts to repay loan on time: 
         
  
Paying from other in come sources 
 
26
 
96.3 %
 
55
 
94.8%
 
81
 
95.3%
 
Maintaining collateralized trees 
 
1
 
3.7 %
 
3
 
5.2%
 
4
 
4.7%
 
Tree failure possibility causes: 
         
  
Pests and Diseases 
 
27
 
100 %
 
12
 
20.7%
 
39
 
45.9%
 
Natural disasters
  
-
 
-
 
32
 
55.2%
 
32
 
37.6%
 
Fire
  
-
 
-
 
7
 
12.1%
 
7
 
8.2%
 
Thievery
  
-
 
-
 
7
 
12.1%
 
7
 
8.2%
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Table 2 Performance of PTT-HR
Aspect
 
Wonosobo
 
Blora
 
Total
 
n
 
%
 
n
 
%
 
n
 
%
 
Loan acquiring process:
      
 
Very easy
 
2
 
7.4%
 
-
 
-
 
2
 
2.4%  
Easy
 
24
 
88.9%
 
41
 
70.7%
 
65
 
76.5%  
Moderate
 
1
 
3.7%
 
3
 
5.2%
 
4
 
4.7%
 
Difficult
 
-
 
-
 
10
 
17.2%
 
10
 
11.8%
 
Very difficult
 
-
 
-
 
4
 
6.9%
 
4
 
4.7%
 Required time from the submission until loan 
agreement:
 
     
 
120 days 27  100.0%  -  -  27  31.8%
 
150 days -  -  11  19.0%  11  12.9%
 
180 days
 
-
 
-
 
29
 
50.0%
 
29
 
34.1%
 
365 days
 
-
 
-
 
18
 
31.0%
 
18
 
21.2%
 
The institut ions/person who helped the submission 
of the loan:
 
     
 
Farmers group
 
27
 
100%
 
58
 
100 %
 
85
 
100%
 
The appropriateness of the loan amount received:
      
 
Appropriate
 
26
 
96.3%
 
56
 
96.6%
 
82
 
96.5%
 
Not appropriate
 
1
 
3.7%
 
2
 
3.4%
 
3
 
3.5%
 
Utilization of PTT -HR fund:
      
 
Educational needs
 
-
 
-
 
2
 
3.4%
 
2
 
2.4%
 
Daily needs
 
3
 
11.1%
 
-
 
-
 
3
 
3.5%
 
Vehicle needs
 
1
 
3.7%
 
3
 
5.2%
 
4
 
4.7%
 
Business capital ( livestock,
 
truck,
 
trading, 
farm/garden, sugar)
 
17
 
63.0%
 
49
 
84.5%
 
66
 
77.6%
 
Political needs (head of village campaign)
 
-
 
-
 
2
 
3.4%
 
2
 
2.4%
 
Repayment of a loan
 
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.7%
 
1
 
1.2%
 
Savings
 
1
 
3.7%
 
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.2%
 
Buying the land
 
1
 
3.7%
 
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.2%
 
House renovation
 
4
 
14.8%
 
1
 
1.7%
 
5
 
5.9%
 
Conformity with the problems encountered:
      
 
Could solve the problem
 
16
 
59.3%
 
54
 
93.1%
 
70
 
82.4%
 
Does not resolve problem
 
11
 
40.7%
 
4
 
6.9%
 
15
 
17.6%
 
Lending period:
      
 
1 year
 
1
 
3.7%
 
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.2%
 
3 years
 
15
 
55.6%
 
-
 
-
 
15
 
17.6%
 
5 years
 
11
 
40.7%
 
45
 
77.6%
 
56
 
65.9%
 
8 years
 
-
 
-
 
4
 
6.9%
 
4
 
4.7%
 
10 years
 
-
 
-
 
9
 
15.5%
 
9
 
10.6%
 
Fund disbursement phases:
       
1 time
 
27
 
100.0%
 
55
 
94.8%
 
82
 
96.5%
 
2 times
 
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.7%
 
1
 
1.2%
 
3 times - - 2 3.4% 2 2.4%
 
 
 
respondents propose to lengthen the lending period up to  five
years for sengon and 8−10 years for teak. The addition of 
lending period would make their business (investment) will 
be more established besides their collateral trees would be 
older and bigger as well as more expensive.
 The other thing that complained by 96.5% of respondents 
were phases within loan funds disbursement. The rules 
applied by BLU is for a loan below IDR10 million will be 
disbursed within  phase, IDR10−IDR20 million within one
two phases, and ˃ IDR20 million within three phases. This 
gradual disbursement mechanism can't be utilized funds 
optimally from respondent point of view, especially if it is to 
be used for business capital.
PTT-HR impacts to the farmer's welfare 
1 Teak as collateral
  The teak trees which can be used as collateral are very 
diverse, there are farmers who choose large diameter 
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trees in order to received large loan amount, but there are 
also farmers who choose the small diameter trees. In this 
study the size of the tree used as the basis for calculating 
the incremental of welfare or profit is the size of the tree 
most often used as loan collateral that is 10−13 cm 
diameter with the age of about 10 years and with an 
estimated price of IDR76,000 per tree. Based on field 
data, within a period of five years, the tree will be sized 
from 16−19 cm with a price of IDR185,000 up to 
IDR260,000 per tree depend on the quality. The present 
value of benefit received by farmers (S) in some 
probability of prices per tree at the end of lending period 
and at some interest rates can be described in Table 3 
using calculation basis as follow:
 1 Under the terms of loans, the maximum amount of 
loans that would be obtained by borrowers is 80% 
from market price of the collateral trees (IDR60,800 
per tree); 
 2 Principal of loan and interest is paid at the end of 
lending period; 
 3 Interest (5.75% per annum) calculations using a 
simple interest method as regulated by Center of P2H;
 4 Annual maintenance costs is IDR 15,000 per tree or 
IDR7,500,000 per ha (with 500 trees ha ). 
-1
  Table 3.
  Table 3 explains that at all possible prices at the end of 
lending period (from IDR 185,000 up to IDR260,000 per 
tree) with interest rate up to 7.5%,   the present value of  
additional benefits received by farmers who borrow PTT-
HR (S) are positive (S > 0). Thus, by borrowing the 
money in order to fulfill their urgent needs from the 
Center of P2H will be profitable than selling the teak. In 
other words, the additional value during lending period is 
greater than the value of the principal loan and its interest.
2 Sengon as collateral
  In the case of sengon as collateral, commonly the 
farmers collateralized their trees in aged of 5−15 years 
with three years lending period. The average price of 
sengon per tree is IDR25,000 at age 5 years, 
IDR40,000−IDR60,000 per tree at age 10 years, and 
IDR80,000−IDR200,000 per tree at age 15 years.  In this 
case the size of the tree most often used as loan collateral 
is tree at age five years and tree at age 10 years.
  The present value of benefit received by farmers (S) 
in some probability of prices per tree at the end of lending 
period and at some interest rates can be described in Table 
4 for the case of collateral tree at age  years and Table five
5 for the collateral tree at age 10 years using calculation 
basis as follow:
 1 Under the terms of loans, the maximum amount of 
loans that would be obtained by borrowers is 80% 
from market price of the collateral trees (IDR20,000 
per tree for the collateral tree at age  years and five
IDR 40,000 per tree for the collateral tree at age 10 
years);
 2 Principal loan and its interest is paid at the end of 
lending period; 
 3 Interest (5.75% per annum) calculations using a 
simple interest method as regulated by Center of P2H;
 4 Annual maintenance costs is IDR2,000 per tree or 
IDR2,000,000 per ha (with 1000 trees ha ). 
-1
  Table 4.
  Average price per tree for the collateral at age  five
years is IDR25,000 at the beginning of loan period. 
Within lending period of three years, the price would be 
around IDR34,000−IDR46,000 per tree. Even though 
 
 
 
Aspect  
Wonosobo  Blora  Total  
n
 
%
 
n
 
%
 
n
 
%
 
      
Suitability between log price estimated by farmer 
(borrower) and estimated by Center of P2H:
 
      Suitable
 
-
 
-
 
1
 
1.7%
 
1
 
1.2%
Not suitable (price estimates from the Center of P2H 
is lower than the estimated price by the borrower)
27
 
100.0%
 
57
 
98.3%
 
84
 
98.8%
Table 2 Performance of PTT-HR
-1
Table 3 Present value of additional profits of PTT-HR for teak as collateral (IDR tree )
Tree price at the 
end of lending 
period
 
(IDR tree-1)
 
Present value
 
of additional profit (S) at interest rate
 
(IDR tree-1)
 
5.00%
 
5.75%
 
6.00%
 
6.50%
 
7.00%
 
7.50%
   
185.000 
 
              
17.015 
 
                
13.219 
 
                
12.003 
 
                   
9.642 
 
                   
7.372 
 
5.191 
   
200.000 
 
                
28.768 
 
                
24.561 
 
                
23.212 
 
                
20.590 
 
                
18.067 
 
15.640 
   
215.000 
 
                
40.521 
 
                
35.903 
 
                
34.421 
 
               
31.538 
 
                
28.762 
 
26.088 
   230.000  
                
52.274  
                
47.245  
                
45.630  
                
42.486  
                
39.457  36.536 
   
245.000 
 
                
64.027 
 
     
58.587 
 
                
56.838 
 
53.435 
 
                
50.152 
 
46.985 
260.000 
                
75.780 
                
69.929 
                
68.047 
                
64.383 
                
60.846 57.433 
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tree price is IDR 34,000 at the end of the loan period will 
giving positive present value of additional benefits, but 
that is not so interesting cause of little amount of 
additional benefits (ranging IDR65−IDR783 per tree), 
even in the interest rate more than 6% the farmer will 
receive negative additional benefits. The decision to 
borrow money from the P2H Center will be better and 
secure when the price at the end of lending period is 
IDR37,000 and more, even the annual interest rate raise 
up to 7.5% (Table 4).
  At the beginning of loan period, average price per tree 
for the collateral at age 10 years is IDR50,000 (median of 
IDR40,000−IDR60,000). Within lending period of three 
years, the price would be around IDR68,000− 
IDR140,000 per tree. Even though tree price is only IDR 
68,000 at the end of the loan period, the decision to 
borrow money from the P2H Center will be better and 
secure even if annual interest rate raise up to 7.5% 
(Table 5).
Effectiveness of PTT-HR  oneDuring  year implementation 
of PTT-HR seems in line with the objectives of policy or it is 
effective according to criteria that proposed by Dye (2002), 
Dunn (2003) Tron (2009). This can be shown by some , and 
indicators as follow:
1 The collateralized tree already has a selling price but is 
not yet mature enough to be felled.
2 Delaying to harvest is a lucrative option for farmers with 
a positive net present value of additional benefits (S > 0) 
at a specified interest rate required by Center of P2H. 
3 Utilization of PTT-HR primarily for working 
(investment) capital to strengthen household income  and 
livelihood (expressed by 77.6% of respondents). In the 
long term the use of PTT-HR funds for business capital is 
expected able to alleviate poverty, develop self-
employed farmers' businesses that can generate 
revenues, empower the people's economy, expand 
employment opportunities  and become a source of ,
income for the strengthening of loan repayments.
4 PTT-HR is perceived as a new breakthrough, suited to the 
needs of the community (expressed by 82.4% of 
respondents), a lower interest rate (5.75%) than the 
interest rate of other financial institutions (15−20%), the 
application process is easy (expressed by 76.5% of 
respondents), loans given directly through the account of 
the borrower that make more transparent  and the loan ,
amount in accordance with the proposed one (expressed 
by 96.5% of respondents).
5 The availability of other sources of revenue for 
repayment of the loan (expressed by 95.3% of 
respondents). So the concern of Bichanga & Aseyo 
(2013) that mentions one of the causes of failure of 
micro-credit loan repayment is the lack of asset can be 
minimized.
 However, there are still some weaknesses of the system 
as perceived by respondents as listed below:
1 Processing time of  loan applications is still too long  
(100% of respondents stated above 120 days). 
Clarification to the P2H Center states that the delay was 
caused by the provision of the loan must be done 
prudentially, the system is not perfect yet and the number 
of officers are limited to verify the proposal.
2 Loan that are delivered in two or more phases reduced the 
chance of the farmers to use the loan for a significant 
needs (96.5% of respondents wants the one-time 
payment).
3 There were complaints that the price estimates from the 
Center of P2H is lower than the estimated price of the 
-1
Table 4 Present value of additional profits of PTT-HR for sengon as collateral (IDR tree )  
  
  
  
  
  
Tree price at the end 
of lending period
 
(IDR tree-1)
 
 
Present value of additional profits (S) at interest rate
 
5.00%
 
5.75%
 
6.00%
 
6.50%
 
7.00%
 
7.50%
34.000
  
783 
  
241 
  
65 
  
(280)
  
(616)
 
(944)
37.000
  
3.375 
  
2.778 
  
2.584 
  
2.204 
  
1.833 
 
1.471 
40.000
  
5.966 
  
5.315 
  
5.103 
  
4.687 
  
4.281 
 
3.886 
43.000   8.558   7.852   7.622   7.171   6.730  6.301 
46.000
  
11.149 
  
10.388 
  
10.141 
  
9.654 
  
9.179 
 
8.716 
-1
Table 5  Present value of additional profits of PTT-HR for teak as collateral (IDR tree )
Tree price at the 
end of lending 
period
 
(IDR
 
tree-1)
 
Present value at interest rate
 
5.00%
 
5.75%
 
6.00%
 
6.50%
 
7.00%
 
7.50%
68.000
  
5.286 
  
4.162 
  
3.797 
  
3.081 
  
2.383 
  
1.703 
86.000
  
20.835 
  
19.383 
  
18.910 
  
17.983 
  
17.077 
  
16.192 
104.000
  
36.384 
  
34.603 
  
34.024 
  
32.884 
  
31.770 
  
30.682 
122.000  51.933   49.824   49.137   47.785   46.463   45.171 
140.000
  
67.482 
  
65.045 
  
64.250 
  
62.686 
  
61.157 
  
59.660 
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borrower (expressed by 98.8% of respondents). This 
indicates that it needs to be more transparent in the pricing 
of trees.
4 Information provided to farmers and farmer groups often 
change.
5 The loan proposal was made by farmer group, but the loan 
was distributed to the farmers directly. This condition 
made farmer group administrators unhappy, because the 
farmer group had to bear the cost of proposal preparation 
without any compensation from the farmers as well as 
Center of P2H.
6 Lack of technical assistance to address the threat of pests 
and plant diseases as well as other factors.
 To overcome those weaknesses, it is required to improve 
the policy regarding to scaling up and scaling out of PTT-HR 
as follows:
1 The service of P2H should be closer to the customers. It 
can be conducted by forming intermediary institution or 
develop on site level organization of P2H Center. 
Intermediary institution or on site level organization is 
expected to know more about potential farmers as PTT-
HR customers and can provide assistances to farmers 
(borrowers) intensively. In other words the asymmetric 
information problems can be minimized.
2 Requirements and procedures need to be defined more 
clearly so that prospective borrowers can assess 
themselves properly whether they are eligible for a loan 
or not.  For example is about eligible age of borrower 
candidates and document requirements. Because it was 
not explained at the beginning, so many candidates of 
borrower made preparations such as inventory and 
marking trees, but they did not get a loan because out of 
age range termed by Center of P2H or because they did 
not able to show the original ID Card and letter of land 
ownership.
3 The customers want to receive loan in one stage 
disbursement to get flexibility in use. PTT-HR is aimed to 
fulfill farmer's need when they need money in urgent 
situation with huge amount. With PTT-HR, farmers do 
not have to harvest their young (or small diameter) trees 
to get cash for their urgent needs. In this circumstance the 
gradual delivery of loan disbursement is becoming less 
relevant. Moreover, the farmers have already handed 
their trees for collateral.
4 It would be better to provide the mechanism of loan 
repayment before due date (early repayment).
 The important lesson from this study is in fact that 
microfinance loans (in this case is PTT-HR) be able to 
provide an opportunity to utilize farmer's spare time to be 
more productive. For example, with IDR10 million loan 
farmers can buy a cow and in one year they could sell the cow 
at IDR13 million. Such a practice has become a very long 
farmer's experience. Thus PTT-HR program potentially can 
improve welfare of participant farmer, empower rural 
potency, and finally accelerate rural development accordance 
with the role of ideal forestry microfinance as stated by 
Gondo (2009) who mentioned that community based 
sustainable forest management needs financial support and 
access to increase participation of local communities in forest 
management, provide livelihood opportunities, and alleviate 
the poverty.
Conclusion
 Based on the evaluation parameters derived from 
PTT-HR objectives which include collateralized stand age, 
the ability to improve farmer's welfare, loan utilization, 
perceptions about the ease of the process and the intended 
use, as well as repayment ability, it seems PTT-HR 
policies have been implemented effectively, at least for a 
period of about one year implementation. According to the 
borrower, however, there are some weaknesses in the 
implementation, such as the process takes too much time, 
the phases of the loan disbursement that is not in accordance 
with the wishes and needs of farmers, the estimated price 
is low, information on lending requirements and procedures 
that are not clear, the involvement of farmer groups in 
the disbursement of funds, and lack of technical assistance 
to address the threat of failure in managing collateral trees. 
The research also raises further questions such as whether 
the 3-year lending period for short-cycle (such as sengon) 
and the 5-year lending period for long-cycle (such as jati) 
is optimal term and whether the PTT-HR program is 
efficient.
Recommendations
 To overcome the weaknesses of the implementation of 
PTT-HR and to scale up as well as to scale out the program, 
there are some necessary corrective actions required, they 
are (1) to develop an organization of Center of P2H at site 
level or alternatively creating intermediary institution to put 
Center of P2H closer to its customers, (2) to make 
requirement and procedures of borrowing clearly, (3) to 
rearrange the stage of loan delivery, (4) to provide technical 
assistance through organization of Center of P2H at site level 
as well as local forestry extension official to minimize the 
failure of loan repayment, (5) to provide early repayment 
mechanism, and (6) to scale up and scale out the service of 
PTT-HR because the scheme allowed farmers to employ 
their spare time more productively, and (7) to perform further 
research focusing on efficiency of the implementation of 
PTT-HR policy as well as to calculate optimum lending 
period both for short-cycle species and long-cycle species.
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